Political Repression and Education in the 1980s
2:15 PM
Edit
Political Repression and Education in the 1980s
The effects of political repression on education in Somalia were many and multi-faceted. According to the United Nations Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO, 1991). Somalia’s literacy rate was 24% (36% for males and 14% for females) in 1990. This dismal literacy situation was compounded by the fact that in 1988, the rate of access to radio receivers per 1000 inhabitants was 40, while that for television receivers for the same number of inhabitants was 0.4 (UNESCO, 1991). And to get a clear picture of how the situation was deteriorating, the gross enrolment ratios for 4-23 year olds was 14% in 1980; by 1988, that had slid back to 7% (UNESCO, 1991).
As the economy was weakened by Somalia’s border war with Ethiopia in 1977-1978 (Lyons & Samatar, 1995), the military regime did not introduce any national development programmes for reconstruction. Instead, and especially since the coup attempt by dissident military officers in April 1978, and the subsequent execution of 17 officers (Sheikh-Abdi, 1981), the government embarked on crushing what it called ‘domestic enemies’. Among the most prominent elements of this internal campaign was the proliferation of nepotism and favouritism. With this came, among other management misfortunes, the corruption of the education system where the de-development-oriented maxim yaad taqaannaa (who do you know) replaced the development-oriented maxaad taqaannaa (what do you know) in admissions, scholarships, fields of specialization and types of employment after graduation.
The tragedy of corruption in military-ruled Somalia was not unique to the country’s learning systems, nor was it limited to Somalia in chronically underdeveloped Africa (Brittain, 1994). Africa whose share of world trade in manufactured goods fell from a dismal 0.4% in 1965 to a disastrous 0.2% in 1986 (Kennedy, 1993), seems more peripheral than ever. Africa’s quasi- moribund economic situation is complemented by what Bayart (1993) portrays as the completely corrupted state structure and functions in the continent. The combined forces of economic collapse and institutional corruption have, in the words of Brittain (1994), forced ‘100,000 African professionals and intellectuals to flee their continent in search of better opportunities, thus bleeding their countries of the talent, education, and energy that would offer a chance of reversing the trend of de-development’ (p. 22).
In Somalia’s case in particular, the problems of corruption and mismanagement were compounded by the phenomenon of cold war induced disproportionate armament. Because of border conflicts the country inherited from the colonial legacy, and because of super power opportunism, Somalia was one of the most militarized countries in the world. Consequently, social programmes such as education and health care were relegated to negligible status in expenditure. In effect, the 1984 estimates, as the percentage of state expenditures, show that the Somali government was spending 36% on defence and security, while it spent 10.5% on social programmes including education, and only 8% on economic issues and development (Samatar, 1988).
The combination of internal conflict, superpower opportunism, economic decay, institutional corruption, and eventually the end of bi-polarity and the inauguration of the New World Order, could all explain the collapse of the Somali state in 1991. These could also rationalize why, with the collapse of the state, the only things Somalis could find in abundance were American- and Soviet-made assault rifles, artillery pieces, tanks, missiles and fighter jets. All this military hardware seemingly was useful as Somalis decided to kill one another, and destroy, at times with rocket science accuracy, all social and economic infrastructure of which educational institutions and facilities were among the first casualties. At the end, Somalia, even within the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, may be educationally and, therefore, developmentally more marginalized than other countries. In this regard, the World Bank (1995) reports that while the median level of illiteracy is 56% per Sub-Saharan for Africa, it is 81% for Somalia. This is complemented by a median infant mortality rate of 93.1% for Sub-Saharan Africa and 120% for Somalia, and a median life expectancy of 52 years for Sub-Saharan Africa and 47 years for Somalia (World Bank, 1995) [ 1].
The effects of political repression on education in Somalia were many and multi-faceted. According to the United Nations Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO, 1991). Somalia’s literacy rate was 24% (36% for males and 14% for females) in 1990. This dismal literacy situation was compounded by the fact that in 1988, the rate of access to radio receivers per 1000 inhabitants was 40, while that for television receivers for the same number of inhabitants was 0.4 (UNESCO, 1991). And to get a clear picture of how the situation was deteriorating, the gross enrolment ratios for 4-23 year olds was 14% in 1980; by 1988, that had slid back to 7% (UNESCO, 1991).
As the economy was weakened by Somalia’s border war with Ethiopia in 1977-1978 (Lyons & Samatar, 1995), the military regime did not introduce any national development programmes for reconstruction. Instead, and especially since the coup attempt by dissident military officers in April 1978, and the subsequent execution of 17 officers (Sheikh-Abdi, 1981), the government embarked on crushing what it called ‘domestic enemies’. Among the most prominent elements of this internal campaign was the proliferation of nepotism and favouritism. With this came, among other management misfortunes, the corruption of the education system where the de-development-oriented maxim yaad taqaannaa (who do you know) replaced the development-oriented maxaad taqaannaa (what do you know) in admissions, scholarships, fields of specialization and types of employment after graduation.
The tragedy of corruption in military-ruled Somalia was not unique to the country’s learning systems, nor was it limited to Somalia in chronically underdeveloped Africa (Brittain, 1994). Africa whose share of world trade in manufactured goods fell from a dismal 0.4% in 1965 to a disastrous 0.2% in 1986 (Kennedy, 1993), seems more peripheral than ever. Africa’s quasi- moribund economic situation is complemented by what Bayart (1993) portrays as the completely corrupted state structure and functions in the continent. The combined forces of economic collapse and institutional corruption have, in the words of Brittain (1994), forced ‘100,000 African professionals and intellectuals to flee their continent in search of better opportunities, thus bleeding their countries of the talent, education, and energy that would offer a chance of reversing the trend of de-development’ (p. 22).
In Somalia’s case in particular, the problems of corruption and mismanagement were compounded by the phenomenon of cold war induced disproportionate armament. Because of border conflicts the country inherited from the colonial legacy, and because of super power opportunism, Somalia was one of the most militarized countries in the world. Consequently, social programmes such as education and health care were relegated to negligible status in expenditure. In effect, the 1984 estimates, as the percentage of state expenditures, show that the Somali government was spending 36% on defence and security, while it spent 10.5% on social programmes including education, and only 8% on economic issues and development (Samatar, 1988).
The combination of internal conflict, superpower opportunism, economic decay, institutional corruption, and eventually the end of bi-polarity and the inauguration of the New World Order, could all explain the collapse of the Somali state in 1991. These could also rationalize why, with the collapse of the state, the only things Somalis could find in abundance were American- and Soviet-made assault rifles, artillery pieces, tanks, missiles and fighter jets. All this military hardware seemingly was useful as Somalis decided to kill one another, and destroy, at times with rocket science accuracy, all social and economic infrastructure of which educational institutions and facilities were among the first casualties. At the end, Somalia, even within the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, may be educationally and, therefore, developmentally more marginalized than other countries. In this regard, the World Bank (1995) reports that while the median level of illiteracy is 56% per Sub-Saharan for Africa, it is 81% for Somalia. This is complemented by a median infant mortality rate of 93.1% for Sub-Saharan Africa and 120% for Somalia, and a median life expectancy of 52 years for Sub-Saharan Africa and 47 years for Somalia (World Bank, 1995) [ 1].